PEOPLE vs. ESTRADA

G.R. No. 164368-69
April 2, 2009

FACTS:

An Information for plunder was filed with the Sandiganbayan against respondent Estrada, among other accused. A separate Information for illegal use of alias was likewise filed. The Amended Information reads: “…to conceal the ill-gotten wealth he acquired during his tenure and his true identity as the President, represents himself as JOSE VELARDE in several transactions and use and employ the said alias Jose Velarde which is neither his registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Joseph Estrada’s use of his alias Jose Velarde was not public despite the presence of Messrs. Aprodicio Laquian and Fernando Chua on 4 February 2000 (YES, not public)

2. Whether or not Joseph Estrada’s use of his alias Jose Velarde was allowable under banking rules, despite the clear prohibition under Commonwealth Act No. 142; (YES, allowable when the act was committed)

3. Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in limiting the coverage of the amended Information in Crim. Case No. 26565 to the use of the alias Jose Velarde by respondent Joseph Estrada on February 4, 2000; (Not limitative [procedural question])

4. Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred and abused its discretion in departing from its earlier final finding on the non-applicability of Ursua v. Court of Appeals and forcing its application to the instant case. (NO)

HELD:

The petition has no merit.

The Law on Illegal Use of Alias and the Ursua Ruling

Ursua definition of an alias: a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. There must be a sign or indication that the user intends to be  known by this name (the alias) in addition to his real name, and there must be habituality. The repeated use of an alias within a single day cannot be deemed habitual, as it does not amount to a customary practice or use.

Following the doctrine of stare decisis, we are guided by the Ursua ruling on how the crime punished under CA No. 142 may be committed.
The court found no merit in the argument that the Sandiganbayan erred when it resurrected the application of Ursua, resulting in the reversal of its earlier final ruling.   First, the cited Sandiganbayan resolution is a mere interlocutory order. Second, in the earlier motion to quash, the Sandiganbayan solely looked at the allegations of the Information to determine the sufficiency of these allegations and did not consider any evidence aliened.    

What is the coverage of the indictment?  (Regarding the limitative coverage)

The court found no merit on the argument of the People that the Sandiganbayan abused its discretion in limiting the coverage of the amended Information to Estrada's use of the alias Jose Velarde on February 4, 2000, considering that there were other transactions covered by the phrase prior to or subsequent thereto.

The date of the commission of the offense need not be precisely stated in the complaint or information except when the precise date is a material ingredient of the offense. 

Under this analysis, the several transactions involving the signing of documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities all had their reference to February 4, 2000; they were all made on or about or prior or subsequent to that date, thus plainly implying that all these transactions took place only on February 4, 2000 or on another single date sometime before or after February 4, 2000. To be sure, the Information could have simply said on or about February 4, 2000 to capture all the alternative approximate dates, so that the phrase sometime prior or subsequent thereto would effectively be a surplusage that has no meaning separately from the on or about already expressed. This consequent uselessness of the prior or subsequent thereto phrase cannot be denied, but it is a direct and necessary consequence of the use of the OR between the two phrases and the THERETO that referred back to February 4, 2000 in the second phrase. Of course, the reading would have been very different (and would have been clearly in accord with the Peoples present interpretation) had the Information simply used AND instead of OR to separate the phrases; the intent to refer to various transactions occurring on various dates and occasions all proximate to February 4, 2000 could not be disputed. Unfortunately for the People, the imprecision in the use of OR is the reality the case has to live with. To act contrary to this reality would violate Estradas right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him; the multiple transactions on several separate days that the People claims would result in surprise and denial of an opportunity to prepare for Estrada, who has a right to rely on the single day mentioned in the Information.

The issues of publicity, and the application of CA No. 142, R.A. No. 1405,

and R.A. No. 9160

The rule in the law of libel that mere communication to a third person is publicity does not apply to violations of CA No. 142. The use of the alias, to be considered public, must be made openly, or in an open manner or place, or to cause it to become generally known, in other words, the intent to publicly use the alias must be manifest.

The enactment of R.A. No. 9160 clearly manifests that prior to its enactment, numbered accounts or anonymous accounts were permitted banking transactions, whether they be allowed by law or by a mere banking regulation. To be sure, an indictment against Estrada using this relatively recent law cannot be maintained without violating the constitutional prohibition on the enactment and use of ex post facto laws.

*The above case digest is only a guide. I highly recommend that you read the FULL TEXT.