US vs. AH CHONG

GR. No. L-5272

March 19, 1910 


FACTS:

One night, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant was suddenly awakened by someone trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room.

The room was very dark and the defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair which had been placed against the door.

In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable that the chair was merely thrown back into the room by the sudden opening of the door against which it rested. 

eizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual.

ISSUES:

1) Whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible, who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act 

2) Whether malice or criminal intent is an essential element or ingredient of the crimes of homicide and assassination as defined and penalized in the Penal Code

HELD:

1) The Court holds that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith. In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged "cancels the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of Article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different from that which he intended to commit.

2) The definitions of crimes and offenses as set out in the Penal Code rarely contain provisions expressly declaring that malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient of the crime, nevertheless, the general provisions of Article 1 of the code clearly indicate that malice, or criminal intent in some form, is an essential requisite of all crimes and offense therein defined, in the absence of express provisions modifying the general rule, such as are those touching liability resulting from acts negligently or imprudently committed, and acts done by one voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor, where the act committed is different from that which he intended to commit.

The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words "criminal intent," and the direct inference from its provisions is that the commission of the acts contemplated therein, in the absence of malice (criminal intent), negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any criminal liability on the actor. 

Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part. "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him."

In this case, the defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow in the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense.

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