INTOD vs CA

G.R. No. 103119

October 21, 1992 

FACTS: 

At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig, all armed with firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's house. At the instance of his companions, Mandaya pointed the location of Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room. It turned out, however, that Palangpangan was in another City and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired the shots. No one was hit by the gun fire. 

RTC: Convicted Intod of ATTEMPTED MURDER CA: Affirmed in toto 

ISSUE:

Whether or not the crime committed is impossible crime (YES)

HELD:

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime. Thus, legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where:

1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; 

2) there is intention to perform the physical act; 

3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and 

4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime. 

The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category. 

On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. One example is the man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty. 

The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end.

In Philippine jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself.

*The above case digest is only a guide. I highly suggest that you read the FULL TEXT.

PEOPLE vs. VILLACORTA

G.R. No. 186412

September 7, 2011

FACTS: 

While Cruz was ordering bread at Mendeja’s store, Villacorta suddenly appeared and stabbed Cruz on the left side of Cruz’s body using a sharpened bamboo stick. The bamboo stick broke and was left in Cruz’s body. Immediately after the stabbing incident, Villacorta fled. 

RTC rendered a Decision finding Villacorta guilty of murder, qualified by treachery. The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming in toto the RTC judgment of conviction against Villacorta. 

ISSUE: 

Whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death 

HELD:

The proximate cause of Cruz’s death is the tetanus infection and not the stab wound.

In the event he is found to have indeed stabbed Cruz, he should only be held liable for slight physical injuries for the stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz.

If Cruz acquired severe tetanus infection from the stabbing, then the symptoms would have appeared a lot sooner than 22 days later. Ultimately, we can only deduce that Cruz’s stab wound was merely the remote cause, and its subsequent infection with tetanus might have been the proximate cause of Cruz's death. The infection of Cruz’s stab wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Cruz was stabbed to the time of his death.  The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.  *The above case digest is only a guide. I highly suggest that you read the FULL TEXT.

URBANO vs. IAC

157 SCRA 1, G.R. 72964

January 7, 1988 

FACTS: 

On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano went to his ricefield and found the place where he stored his palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed. Urbano saw Javier and the latter admitted that he was the one responsible. A quarrel between them ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm of his hand, which was used in parrying the bolo hack. Urban was also hacked Javier on the left leg with the back portion of said bolo, causing a swelling on said leg.

Upon the intercession of Councilman, Urbano and Javier agreed to settle their differences. Urbano promised to pay P700.00 for the medical expenses of Javier. Hence, on October 27, 1980, the two accompanied by Solis appeared before the San Fabian Police to formalize their amicable settlement. 

However, on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the hospital with a lockjaw and was having convulsions. The doctor found that it was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus. 

On November 15, 1980 Javier died in the hospital. An information for homicide was filed against Urbano. The RTC found Urbano guilty of the crime charged.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death (YES)

HELD:

The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound.

We look into the nature of tetanus- 

The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and the appearance of unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days. However, over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic within 14 days. A short incubation period indicates severe disease, and when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality rate approaches 100 percent. 

Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends on the incubation period of the disease. 

In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day, November 15, 1980, he died. 

If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died. 

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and  foreign to the crime. 

*The above case digest is only a guide. I highly suggest that you read the FULL TEXT.

LONEY vs. PEOPLE

482 SCRA 195
February 10, 2006


FACTS:

Marcopper had been storing tailings from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian, Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. It appears that Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the tunnel’s end which caused the tailings to gushed out of or near the tunnel’s end. In a few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had discharged millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. 

The DOJ separately charged petitioners with violation of Water Code of the Philippines (PD 1067), National Pollution Control Decree of 1976 (PD 984),  Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (RA 7942), and Article 365 of the RPC for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property. 

Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the following grounds: (1) the Informations were "duplicitous" as the DOJ charged more than one offense for a single act.

ISSUE: 

Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed for duplicity of charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property should stand (NO) 

HELD: 

NO. There is no duplicity of charges in the present case. Duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or information charges more than one offense. A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses (Sec. 13, Rule 110). There is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges more than one offense.

Here, however, the prosecution charged each petitioner with four offenses, with each Information charging only one offense.

The filing of several charges is proper. A single act or incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one offense. The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for "the same offense." Here, double jeopardy is not at issue because not all of its elements are present.

On petitioners’ claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC "absorbs" the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942, suffice it to say that a mala in se felony (such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property) cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes (such as those violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942). What makes the former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa); what makes the latter crimes are the special laws enacting them.

*The above case digest is only a guide. I highly recommend that you read the FULL TEXT.

US vs. AH CHONG

GR. No. L-5272

March 19, 1910 


FACTS:

One night, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant was suddenly awakened by someone trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room.

The room was very dark and the defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair which had been placed against the door.

In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable that the chair was merely thrown back into the room by the sudden opening of the door against which it rested. 

eizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual.

ISSUES:

1) Whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible, who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act 

2) Whether malice or criminal intent is an essential element or ingredient of the crimes of homicide and assassination as defined and penalized in the Penal Code

HELD:

1) The Court holds that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith. In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged "cancels the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of Article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different from that which he intended to commit.

2) The definitions of crimes and offenses as set out in the Penal Code rarely contain provisions expressly declaring that malice or criminal intent is an essential ingredient of the crime, nevertheless, the general provisions of Article 1 of the code clearly indicate that malice, or criminal intent in some form, is an essential requisite of all crimes and offense therein defined, in the absence of express provisions modifying the general rule, such as are those touching liability resulting from acts negligently or imprudently committed, and acts done by one voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor, where the act committed is different from that which he intended to commit.

The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words "criminal intent," and the direct inference from its provisions is that the commission of the acts contemplated therein, in the absence of malice (criminal intent), negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any criminal liability on the actor. 

Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part. "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him."

In this case, the defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow in the firm belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense.

*The above case digest is only a guide. I highly recommend that you read the FULL TEXT.

VILLAREAL VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 151258

February 1, 2012 

FACTS: 

In February 1991, seven freshmen law students (including Leonardo "Lenny" Villa) of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity).

On the night of February 8, 1991, the neophytes were "briefed" and brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation. The rites were scheduled to last for three days.

The neophytes were subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan "initiation rites." These rites included: 

1. Indian Run – which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering blows to the neophytes; 

2. Bicol Express – which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with their backs against the wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their legs; 

3. Rounds – in which the neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the "auxiliaries" (the Aquilans charged with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation rites), while the latter were being hit with fist blows on their arms or with knee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and

4. Auxies’ Privilege Round – in which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict physical pain on the neophytes. 

They survived their first day of initiation. 

On the morning of their second day, the neophytes were made to present comic plays, play rough basketball, and recite the Aquila Fraternity’s principles. Whenever they would give a wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or legs. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment them physically and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the same manner of hazing that they endured on the first day of initiation.

After a while, accused alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to "paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain. 

Lenny received several paddle blows. After their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk that he had to be carried to the carport. The initiation for the day was officially ended. They then slept at the carport. 

After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny’s shivering and incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he was just overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival. 

Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the 35 Aquilans. 

The trial court rendered judgment holding the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide. The criminal case against the remaining nine accused commenced anew.

The CA set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court and modified the criminal liability of each of the accused according to individual participation. One accused had by then passed away, so the following Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused: 

1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants were acquitted, as their individual guilt was not established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. 

2. Four of the accused-appellants were found guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries. 

3. Two of the accused-appellants – Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal – were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. 

ISSUES: 

1) Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when it set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court and adjudicated the liability of each accused according to individual participation (NO) 

2) Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it pronounced Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug guilty only of slight physical injuries (YES) 

3) Whether or not accused Dizon is guilty of homicide (NO) 

HELD: 

1) NO. Grave abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court simply because it allegedly misappreciated the facts and the evidence. Mere errors of judgment are correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, and not by an application for a writ of certiorari. Pursuant to the rule on double jeopardy, the Court is constrained to deny the Petition contra Victorino et al. – the 19 acquitted fraternity members. 

A verdict of acquittal is immediately final and a re-examination of the merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense. 

2) YES. The CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug criminally liable for slight physical injuries.

Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator shall be liable for the consequences of an act, even if its result is different from that intended. Thus, once a person is found to have committed an initial felonious act, such as the unlawful infliction of physical injuries that results in the death of the victim, courts are required to automatically apply the legal framework governing the destruction of life. This rule is mandatory, and not subject to discretion. The accused cannot be held criminally liable for physical injuries when actual death occurs.

Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon – as if only their acts, in and of themselves, caused the death of Lenny Villa – is contrary to the CA’s own findings. From proof that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries he suffered, the only logical conclusion is that criminal responsibility should redound to all those who have been proven to have directly participated in the infliction of physical injuries on Lenny. 

3) NO. The Court cannot sustain the CA in finding the accused Dizon guilty of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code on the basis of the existence of intent to kill. Animus interficendi cannot and should not be inferred unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent. Instead, the Court adopts and reinstates the finding of the trial court in part, insofar as it ruled that none of the fraternity members had the specific intent to kill Lenny Villa.

*The above case digest is only a guide. I highly recommend that you read the FULL TEXT.

NAVA vs. PALATTAO

G.R. No. 160211
August 28, 2006


FACTS:

An amount of P603,265.00 was released to the DECS for distribution to the newly nationalized high schools located within the region. Through the initiative of accused Venancio Nava, a meeting was called among his seven (7) schools division superintendents whom he persuaded to use the money or allotment for the purchase of Science Laboratory Tools and Devices (SLTD). In other words, instead of referring the allotment to the one hundred fifty-five (155) heads of the nationalized high schools for the improvement of their facilities, accused Nava succeeded in persuading his seven (7) schools division superintendents to use the allotment for the purchase of science education facilities.

In the purchase of the school materials, the law provides that the same shall be done through a public bidding. But in the instant case, evidence shows that accused Nava persuaded his seven (7) schools division superintendents to ignore the circular.

Sandiganbayan found petitioner guilty of violating Section 3(g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, or entering on behalf of the government any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the latter, whether or not the public officer profited or would profit thereby.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is guilty of of violating Section 3(g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. (YES)

HELD:

YES, petitioner is guilty of of violating Section 3(g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. 

For a charge under Section 3(g) to prosper, the following elements must be present:

1) that the accused is a public officer;
2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and
3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.

Petitioner is a public officer, who approved the transactions on behalf of the government, which thereby suffered a substantial loss. The discrepancy between the prices of the SLTDs purchased by the DECS and the samples purchased by the COA audit team clearly established such undue injury. Indeed, the discrepancy was grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. 

The law on public bidding is not an empty formality. It aims to secure the lowest possible price and obtain the best bargain for the government. It is based on the principle that under ordinary circumstances, fair competition in the market tends to lower prices and eliminate favouritism.

We must emphasize however, that the lack of a public bidding and the violation of an administrative order do not by themselves satisfy the third element of Republic Act No. 3019. Lack of public bidding alone does not result in a manifest and gross disadvantage. Indeed, the absence of a public bidding may mean that the government was not able to secure the lowest bargain in its favor and may open the door to graft and corruption. Nevertheless, the law requires that the disadvantage must be manifest and gross. Penal laws are strictly construed against the government.

*The above case digest is only a guide. I highly recommend that you read the FULL TEXT.